Second Question. Whether matter can, by any power, exist without form

Bonaventure, Sent. 2 d.12 q.1 a.1
Scotus, Sent. 2 d.12 q.2
Thomas, ST Ia q.66 a.1
Richard of St. Victor, Sent. 2 d.12 q.4
Francis of Meyronne, Sent. 2 d.12 q.2
Durandus, Sent. 2 d.12 q.2
John Bacconitanus, Sent.2 d.12 q.un.

1. The question, secondly, is whether matter can, by any power, exist without form.

2. That it cannot, from being and nothing: things that are more the same are less separable; but matter and form are more the same than property and subject. The proof is that the latter make a single thing in the second mode [sc. of per se predication], and yet a property cannot be without a subject (as the having of three angles cannot be without triangle).

3. Further there would be logical implication, which I prove as follows: All existence states act; but every act is form. Further all existence is either act or participant in act; but matter is not act because, in its proper idea, it is being in potency; therefore it is participant in act. But act participated by matter can only be form.

4. Again secondly as follows: Everything that can exist per se has some inferior the same as it, namely something that cannot exist per se;     therefore if matter can be a per se proper accident (which cannot exist per se), there will be something inferior to it, and it will not be nothing but something, which is contrary to Augustine Confessions 12.32.

5. On the contrary: quantity, since it is an accident, is no less dependent naturally posterior to substance than matter to form, since form is substance and naturally prior; but quantity without substance can, by divine power, exist in the sacrament [sc. of the altar]; therefore etc     .

To the Question

6. I reply by saying that, for those who say form is an intrinsic degree of matter, it is no surprise if they say matter cannot exist without form, for the same thing cannot exist without itself; but this position was rejected in the preceding question.

7. Other says that matter is really distinct from form, and they save thereby the reality of composition in generable and corruptible things; and yet they say that matter cannot exist without form. The reason is that everything that exists per se is either act or possesses act;     therefore etc     . The proof of the minor is from the Commentator on the substance of the sphere: ‘Matter,’ he says, ‘exists under possibility.’

8. Again the point is proved by Boethius [On the Trinity 1.3]

9. On the contrary: it was shown above that matter, since it is a real positive entity, exists outside its cause and possesses some act, albeit imperfect act.

10. To the Commentator [n.7] I say, therefore that matter is under subjective but not objective possibility, that is, that matter is by its essence immediately susceptive of forms.

11. To Boethius [n.8] I say that it is true of specific and complete being, and it is true de facto and by nature of every being.

12. I say to the question,     therefore , that on the supposition that matter states some positive entity outside its potency (as is plain from the preceding question), then by divine power it can come to exist per se and be preserved in its proper being without any absolute substantial or accidental form.

13. I prove this in three ways. First as follows: everything absolute naturally prior can exist without any absolute really distinct from it; but matter is such with respect to every absolute form; therefore etc     . The major is plain because there is no contradiction involved in affirming being of what is natural prior and denying it of something naturally posterior that is really different from it. The minor is plain too because matter is an absolute entity, otherwise it would not make an absolute composite; and it is also plain because it is substance (On the Soul 2), and is prior by nature to substantial form because it is the foundation of substantial form; also much more so is it prior to accidental form, and it is really distinct from accidental form (from the preceding question).

14. Again, whatever God can do by means of an extrinsic second cause he can do immediately; but form, although it is intrinsic with respect to the composite, is yet extrinsic with respect to the matter, because it is really distinct from it;     therefore etc     .

15. Again, what is contingent with respect to something can exist without that something; but matter is contingent with respect to every form, because it determines no form for itself;     therefore etc     .

16. If you say that at any rate it cannot exist without a respect to God, I say that this respect is not a superadded form but the same as it, but remote, as is plain from the first distinction of this book 2.

17. If you ask further where it exists, I say that it exists somewhere, but not circumscriptively (for it does not have quantity), but definitively, the way an angel does.

18. If you ask whether it has parts, I say that it would have substantial parts, because it does not get these from quantity.

To the Arguments

19. To the first principal argument [nn.2-3] I say that, when speaking of identity between them [sc. matter and form], the major is true and the minor false. For things that are not the same are not more the same but really distinct. When speaking, however, of identity in third resultant [sc. matter and form when combined produce a third, namely the substantial material thing], the minor is true but the major is false. The thing is plain because form is even naturally corrupted when the matter remains the same, albeit under a different form; but the subject does not remain the same when the proper feature is corrupted.

20. As to the second [n.4] I concede that every accident is inferior in entity to the entity of matter, since matter is true substance.

21. To Augustine [n.4] I say that he is speaking about things that are in the genus of substance;     therefore etc     .